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Contrary to the mainstream view, the paper offers a subjectivist approach to growth and 
an institutional view of development. In particular, the term development regards the 
prevailing rules of the game and their effects on the key variables for economic activity 
to take off: property rights and entrepreneurship. And growth is deemed to be the result 
of favourable institutional environments where chances are exploited and individuals 
succeed in improving their living conditions.  
From a methodological standpoint it is then argued that the common attempts to 
measure growth provide at best crude evaluations of the efforts to acquire purchasing 
power, but hardly measure well-being. From a normative perspective, the role of 
growth-enhancing government intervention is thus questioned. Doubts are also raised 
with respect to the recent and increasing literature on institutional design, which seems 
to ignore much of the lessons taught by the institutional schools - both old and new. 
And which tends to describe the past, rather than providing explanations that might help 
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1. Questions on terminology 
Although the debate about the real purpose of economics (or political economy)
1 
remains open, the literature generally agrees on the notions of growth and development 
which should be the object of economic investigation. It refers to growth when dealing 
with proportional changes in GDP or – more frequently – in GDP per capita; and to 
development when analysing living standards  – including features that do not 
necessarily form the object of monetary measurement. In this paper,  however, a 
different view is suggested. Growth is meant to concern changes in the consumers’ 
surplus, rather than in purchasing power; and development regards changes of the 
institutional  context.  This distinction is helpful in two respects. It provides a clear 
separation between subjectivist and institutional issues  – growth and development, 
respectively
2. And it also helps the reader to perceive and possibly disentangle a number 
of areas of potential confusion.  
Hence, the next paragraphs of this section are devoted to discussing a number of 
implications derived from the terminological approach proposed in these pages, which 
                                                 
1 See Buchanan (1979). Economic jargon makes use of the expression ‘political economy’ with two 
different connotations. According to the classical view economics and political economy are 
synonymous. If anything, the term ‘political’ emphasises the fact that economists are supposed to analyse 
social contexts characterised by political organisations (institutions) and that the results of their studies 
should provide guidelines to policymakers. The modern meaning refers to a branch of the so-called 
‘public-choice school’, whereby economists study policy measures under different constitutional 
arrangements. Put differently, in the former case political economy regards individual behaviour and thus 
remains close to a strictly subjectivist straitjacket. In the latter it leads to a holistic approach, whereby the 
human being is replaced either by the ‘representative individual’ or by macro-aggregates; and a-priori 
theorising gives in to empirical investigation. This work accepts the first interpretation and drops the 
second.   
2 The subjectivist nature of the growth question comes from the definition of growth as “an increase in 
well-being”, which is necessarily an individual matter. There is no such thing as collective well-being, 
since tastes cannot be measured, let alone compared or added across individuals. As regards the 
institutional nature of development, more will be said later.   
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is then compared with the traditional view, both from a methodological and a normative 
standpoint. Section 2. is devoted to the discussion of growth, growth policies, and 
government intervention; whereas the following paragraphs discuss the notion of 
development, with emphasis on the institutional side and the avenues of investigation it 
offers (section 3.); the role of politics (section 4.). Section 5. concludes. 
 
On the notions of growth … 
Economics studies the voluntary interaction among human beings, who enhance their 
condition by trading goods with other human beings, often times characterized by 
different preferences and/or skills (Mises 1949 [1996], part I). In order to expand trade 
in goods and services, agents also exchange information and strive to acquire 
knowledge. By doing so, they find better ways to allocate available inputs among 
competing production lines; and discover their (latent) tastes through a trial and error 
process, which benefits from previous mistakes and follows the evolution of preferences 
and habits through time.  
The same principles – subjectivism and methodological individualism – also 
suggest that human well-being is the difference between the amount of satisfaction 
(happiness) one enjoys and the sacrifices or disagreeable things one has to undergo, 
either because there is no choice (bad luck, violence), or because such undesirable 
actions are nevertheless necessary in order to attain desired goals, including sheer 
survival. Hence, growth originates either from changes in satisfaction and/or in labor. 
This is indeed what has been occurring since the end of the XIX century (if not earlier), 
when productivity growth has affected both sides of the coin: individual consumption 
has increased dramatically, working conditions have improved considerably, working 
hours per worker per week have generally diminished substantially.  
There is not much more one can say, though. For in order to make any 
quantitative assessment about overall growth, one should be in a position (1) to argue 
that the well-being of one individual living at time t 0 can be measured and compared 
with that of another individual living at time t-i, (2) to sum or average out the results of 
such a comparison across all individuals, (3) to interpret and evaluate the result thus 
obtained according to wertfrei criteria.   
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These are nonsensical exercises in many respects. Inter-personal comparisons of 
satisfaction and preferences are impossible. And quantitative measures of growth  – 
GDP or consumption per capita  - do not really measure satisfaction. Rather, they 
provide a gross assessment of the efforts made in order to acquire purchasing power, 
and of the monetary rewards generated by such efforts. Little is really known about the 
amount of happiness that purchasing power delivers, let alone about the changes in the 
amount of satisfaction that individuals obtain without having to use monetary means of 
payment
3.  
In short, if economic activities are defined in terms of interactions among 
individuals, then the notion of economic growth can only be grasped from a subjectivist 
standpoint and measurement remains elusive. 
 
… and development 
On the other hand, development is here conceived to be a problem of institutional 
evolution; where the term ‘institutional’ refers to the rules of the game within which 
individuals operate. These rules may be formal and informal norms enforced by means 
of violence and credible sanctions (as in the case of laws). Or rules of conduct derived 
from traditions, habits, shared ideologies, the enforcement of which rests on moral 
suasion and social praise or scolding, rather than on codified forms of punishment
4. 
Contrary to the notion of growth, the concept of development may thus apply to a fairly 
well defined geographic area, which can be identified by the rules of the game 
prevailing there at a given time.  
It follows that the difference between development and underdevelopment is 
described by the outcomes the context generates – both from a static viewpoint (e.g. 
                                                 
3 This approach does not rule out quantitative evaluation altogether. Rather, it suggests approximating the 
dynamics of well-being by referring to the dynamics of productivity or technology, which better describe 
the dynamics of consumers’ surplus. Of course, in order to have a satisfactory measure of productivity 
growth, data on GDP per capita should be replaced by data on GDP per hour of work. Furthermore, one 
should also take into account that in today’s advanced economies an increasingly large share of output – 
public consumption – actually reflects inputs,  and that its dynamics has very little to do with changes in 
productivity.  
4 In some texts institutions are also defined as agencies or bodies designed to perform given tasks of 
collective interests. In this light, political parties, universities and sport clubs could all be defined as 
‘institutions’. Still, for the sake of clarity, we shall here confine the term institutions to the rules of the 
game affecting human interaction; and we shall call ‘organizations’ all collective actors designed to 
perform specific functions or striving to attain defined goals.   
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income levels, income distribution, welfare) and from a dynamic perspective (e.g. GDP 
growth rates)
5. A ‘developed country’ is one where the institutional framework has 
respected economic freedom for a long enough period of time. A ‘developing country’ 
is one where economic liberty is on the rise, thereby enhancing higher productivity
6, 
whereas undeveloped countries are those where economic liberty is modest.  
This view of development is of course also consistent with the subjectivist 
approach typical of the growth question, since both ideas revolve around the notion of 
economic liberty, which is typical of a regime where individuals enjoy freedom from 
coercion in their economic activities and is not compatible with most ‘social’ views of 
development, this expression being correlated with the attainment of given standards in 
some key areas defined by the policy-maker, such as average education, average life 
expectancy, average caloric intake, average health conditions, etc.. Put differently, and 
contrary to the mainstream tradition, the quality of the institutional framework does not 
coincide with the production of given goods and services of public interest, nor with the 
proximity to an allegedly shared goal (e.g. agricultural self-sufficiency or income 
equality). Instead the focus is on the definition and protection of property rights, the size 
of government interference in individual decision-making, the discretionary nature of 
such interference.  
   
What kind of growth theory is actually conceivable? 
Most classical economists - Smith was an exception - did not devote much attention to 
growth and development because they had overlooked the foremost variable driving 
growth processes – entrepreneurship. In their view, growth was made possible mainly 
by investment, which in turn was motivated by expected (diminishing) returns to 
capital. In a world without entrepreneurship (and thus with limited technological 
                                                 
5 Along similar lines, Rodrik (2003) makes a distinction between reforms (policies) and institutional 
change. In his view the former may enhance short-term growth episodes, while the latter is necessary for 
sustained growth to take place. Still, this may be confusing. As the author himself concedes, growth 
episodes may also be considered a matter of exogenous shocks, i.e. sheer luck (Hausmann, Pritchett, 
Rodrik 2004).  
6 The causality link between economic liberty and the dynamics of output per-capita is documented by 
Gwartney, Lawson, Holcombe (1999). See however our remarks on the inadequacies of per capita GDP 
(in the text) and also Karlsson (2005) for a persuasive criticism of the Economic Freedom Index with 
reference to which empirical work in this area is usually carried out.  
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change), demography and the need to replace the decaying stock of capital would then 
define the long-run rate of accumulation. In fact, the classical school had a theory of 
accumulation, rather than a theory of growth.  
Economists eventually started to consider growth matters during the Great 
Depression, while observing the rise in unemployment that accompanied it. Partly 
because of this reason, during the first half of the XXth century growth tended to be 
perceived more as a political issue (the solution to unemployment), rather than a topic 
worthy of economic analysis per se. Indeed, most of the profession neglected to reflect 
on when and why people forego today’s consumption or leisure in order to enhance 
their present and future well-being; or how the meaning of the term well-being changes 
across cultures and through time. Instead, efforts to understand individual behavior were 
replaced by attempts to pursue the common good, whatever that could mean. Politicians 
were  de facto  legitimized to identify the interest of society; and technocrats were 
endorsed with the task of conceiving suitable recipes to attain such common goal
7. 
Since such recipes were applied on a large scale and affected a large number of people, 
it became hard to resist the temptation to study aggregate magnitudes, possibly pursuing 
methodological avenues borrowed from historicism. This still holds true today. 
Mainstream economics has done little to conceive a more realistic theory of 
economic growth, the main reason being that the orthodox view also lacks a theory of 
entrepreneurship. As will be clarified shortly, the most popular views on growth - the 
so-called exogenous and endogenous approaches - do attempt to elucidate how a growth 
process spreads out its effects within an aggregate economic system. But they fail to 
explain why productivity increases (other than arguing that it follows from the fact that 
more and more resources are invested), why the real world does not reproduce the 
regular and smooth processes predicted by the theory and why different areas of the 
world display so many different growth patterns and irregularities
8. In the end, the 
                                                 
7 Before World War I it was felt that public intervention was legitimized by the need to protect 
fundamental individual rights: in short, freedom from coercion and property rights. This does not mean 
that government intervention always confined its activity within those boundaries. In fact most of the time 
it didn’t and the ruler or the ruling class tended to take advantage of the monopoly of violence in order to 
enrich themselves or acquire more discretionary power.  
8 Neo-Schumpeterian and structural approaches provide a more convincing framework within which 
long-run growth phenomena can be understood (Gaffard and Saviotti 2004). But their focus is different. 
They observe when growth opportunities arise, and explain under which conditions and how they spread. 
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results generated by at least five decades of scholarly work on growth are rather 
disappointing. Modeling growth has produced poor explanations and unconvincing 
descriptions.  
Much has to do with the failure to incorporate time into economic reasoning. As 
long as economics continues to be conceived as a social science devoted to studying the 
behavior of macroaggregates and/or the allocation of scarce resources among competing 
uses, one must necessarily assume that technologies, the stock of available inputs and 
preferences are all known and constant; or evolve following known rules. Hence, 
tomorrow necessarily becomes the replication of today, or tomorrow’s information is 
already included in today’s body of knowledge (the rule of change already identified).  
Despite mainstream economics, however, change does take place in the real 
world. Sometimes its direction may be predicted. Still, its features and intensity remain 
uncertain, to say the least. For they are the outcome of a trial and error process, where 
individuals experiment, take risks and revise their choices through repeated selection 
procedures. T his is what happens when people choose among different suppliers of 
goods and services and modify their choices according to their past experiences, their 
new tastes, the new opportunities available. Or when agents take chances and strive to 
acquire temporary market power in their endeavors to see their entrepreneurial efforts 
rewarded by consumers. And also when they choose how to employ their time and 
talent – say leisure, work, investment in human capital.  
As a matter of fact, the presence of time makes it virtually impossible to 
conceive a theory of growth
9. Surely, this impossibility can be circumvented by 
defining growth in terms of inputs (as opposed to individual well-being), in turn 
measured by some kind of physical standard, rather than by prices originating from 
voluntary transactions (exchange) and based on different subjective values; and by 
engaging in extrapolation exercises. But such exercises hardly deserve to be called a 
theory
10.  
                                                 
9 But it does not rule out a theory of development, as explained later on.  
10 These remarks tie in with the previous reference to historicism. Surely, time is not altogether absent 
from the historicist context. Still, it merely serves the purpose of providing a criterion to list or extrapolate 
events. There is no allusion to the fact that individual action takes place through time, so that individual 
decisions are affected by uncertainty, by the returns to knowledge, by the distribution of preferences over 
different time periods.   
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  One should thus conclude that a realistic theory of economic growth actually 
boils down to a theory of choice (how people’s preferences are formed) and of 
entrepreneurship. Since the former is much closer to psychology than to praxeology, the 
study of economic growth is largely a matter of entrepreneurship. In other words, it 
becomes the economics of the acquisition of knowledge, of the returns to knowledge, of 
disequilibrium and competition (Holcombe 1998). Clearly, all this can hardly form the 
object of quantitative assessment, other than some rough measurement concerning labor 
productivity. 
  It is here maintained that freedom to choose and to develop entrepreneurial 
spirits are the true engine of growth
11. Nevertheless, the economic profession has also 
discussed the role of other candidates, such as trade, trade policies and government 
action. The following section tries to address the theoretical underpinnings of these rival 




                                                 
11As summarised by Holcombe (1998), Adam Smith explained growth through specialisation and 
innovation. Specialisation was to be the result of exchange, while innovation was spurred by 
entrepreneurship.  
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2. Trade, government intervention and growth 
The traditional debate about the rules of the game enhancing growth has addressed 
different mechanisms. Two broad categories stand out. One emphasizes the role of 
exchange and specialization. The other puts forward an extensive view, whereby the key 
to achieve higher income and wealth is the ability to mobilize and invest larger amounts 
of inputs into the production process. Thus, government intervention comes into the 
picture either as the designer and manager of optimal trade regimes and policies, or to 
mobilize resources that otherwise would remain underemployed, because of the actors’ 
ignorance or because of alleged ‘market failures’.  
 
The Smithian view on trade: exchange 
According to the so-called ‘Smithian’ approach, exchange is the key engine for growth. 
The underlying reasoning is straightforward, persuasive and may still be regarded today 
as the crucial variable (along with entrepreneurship). Adam Smith was aware that 
resources are limited and, consistent with the historical evidence of his time, observed 
that technological progress played a modest role. But he also perceived that agents 
could enhance their welfare by exchanging goods and services in a free-market context. 
In particular, individuals with different preferences and/or endowments might still 
improve their conditions by selling and buying goods to/from people with different 
tastes and skills. In other words, trade was and is beneficial in that it expanded the 
opportunities to choose and thus increased individual welfare within a competitive 
framework
12. If so the problem of growth becomes one of reducing transaction costs 
(transportation, information and contracting), of transforming local into long-distance  
 
                                                 
12 See also Bauer (1998). Of course, the difference between domestic and international exchange is 
meaningless in a free world. Almost by definition, the theory of international trade makes sense only in a 
world without freedom – i.e. one where agents’ behavior is restricted by different bodies of legislation, 
which affect people’s otherwise spontaneous behavior. That explains the current distinction between 
national and international trade, which refers to different institutional systems regarding traders, rather 
than distance or other variables. The one exception to this institutional vision is of course trade in natural 
resources, whereby the theory of comparative advantage boils down to claiming that resources are 
exported from endowed areas to non-endowed areas.   
  9 
exchange
13; and also one of income distribution.   
The reduction of transaction costs is by and large a matter of technological 
progress (and ultimately entrepreneurship) and institutional change. To these issues is 
devoted section 3. As regards income distribution, it is fairly clear that an economy 
characterized by trade is no worse for everybody than one featuring pure autarky. 
Indeed, it is almost always better and therefore generally preferred. The picture changes, 
however, when one compares different trade regimes - say, moderately open trade vs. 
free trade. If one rules out the extreme situation where  imports are invariably 
concentrated in industries with  no home producers, free trade in a dynamic world 
definitely benefits all consumers; but some producers will gain and some lose or, more 
accurately, some owners of production factors will gain and some will lose as the 
competitive process unfolds. And since individuals are at the same time consumers and 
owners of production factors, the sign of the net effect is not necessarily positive for 
everybody. There is indeed widespread agreement that in an ideal world free trade is the 
best possible regime. In fact, this statement meets no resistance only in a static world. 
That is, in a situation where the structure of production is constant and all home 
producers keep producing and possibly exporting the same goods in the same quantities 
for ever. But when competitive pressure is at work and agents are forced to adjust, the 
attitude towards free trade becomes less enthusiastic. And the arguments in favor of 
policies to reduce adjustment costs become rather attractive. Hence the ongoing success 
of proposals ranging f rom free trade with countervailing measures (for instance 
industrial policies, regulation, tax breaks) to sheer ‘fair trade’ (moderate protectionism). 
Although the technical facets of the various policies may change, their scope and 
alleged legitimacy share the same foundation.  
Therefore, if one excludes violence, the choice of the most desirable regime 
necessarily becomes a question of collective decision-making. And of course, the extent 
to which the preferences of some individuals can be overruled by those of others ends 
up by being an ethical question. Different possibilities are in order. One consists of 
                                                 
13 It is undeniable that agents are in a better position to perceive the needs of those they know better, or 
with whom they share a common culture. Moreover, monitoring and contract enforcement tends to be 
easier within fairly closed communities, among parties that know one another relatively well (reputation 
matters); rather than with unknown, far away agents, characterized by different behavioral patterns and 
traditions.   
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more or less sophisticated versions of utilitarianism, whereby decisions are taken by 
means of majority (or qualified majority) voting
14. Another comes from neo-classical 
quarters and opts for unqualified free trade for questionable reasons (it makes the 
representative individual better off
15). Another perspective is based on the principle of 
human dignity (freedom from coercion) and on property rights acquired according to the 
principle of the first occupant and transferred through voluntary exchange. In this case, 
any departure from free trade would be unacceptable for it would involve a limitation of 
the individual’s freedom to choose among competing suppliers. Of course, the fact that 
such a choice reduces the income of those who are involved in the production of similar 
or different goods makes no difference at all.  
 
Specialization and knowledge today 
A society where trade plays a significant role tends to enhance growth on a second 
account in addition to extended choice. That is specialization. If an individual believes 
that his needs can also be satisfied through exchange, and that his ability to take 
advantage of trade opportunities depends on his terms of trade, then each agent will 
concentrate his efforts on what he can do best and is most appreciated by other agents.  
In the past the notion of specialization was fairly straightforward. Individuals 
were supposed to improve their skills through a learning-by-doing process or by taking 
advantage of economies of scale. As a result, productivity would increase, even in the 
absence of technological change.  
Today the picture has changed. And the Smithian notion of specialization needs 
to be adjusted. Specialization is less a question of being knowledgeable about specific 
issues, than of being able, ready and motivated to acquire new knowledge. In the past 
labor productivity (and welfare) depended on the workers’ skills when entering the 
 
                                                 
14 These decision procedures are studied by the so-called ‘social choice theory’, which has however 
suffered severe attack. See for instance Riker (1982).  
15 Once again, by making use of the representative individual one implicitly has to make use of a cardinal 
measure of happiness to apply across many individuals. It must also admit coercion in order to enforce 
compensation and make everybody better off as the competitive process unfolds. Versions of this position 
currently find support within the no-global movement, as well as among the advocates of regulated 
capitalism.   
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labor market and their suitability to be part of a known production process which was 
supposed to undergo limited change over the years. Instead, today workers must be 
ready to adapt rapidly to relatively new production processes and circumstances (new 
companies, new industries, sometimes even new countries). Trade and globalization 
have magnified this need. In short, flexibility has become more important than 
specialization or  – more appropriately  – the notion of flexible specialization has 
replaced that of specialization.  
As a result, trade offers almost unlimited rewards to those who are quick to 
acquire new information
16, develop new knowledge and - more important - transform it 
into entrepreneurial endeavors, which ultimately produce growth. The key concept, 
clearly, is no longer related to the Smithian benefit generated by production structures 
dictated by comparative advantage on a global scale, but to the incentives to acquire 
knowledge and risk new entrepreneurial endeavors. When this happens intensive growth 
is under way.  
 
Trade and trade policies 
One can thus conclude that the well-known debate on the role of trade policies with 
respect to growth begs the wrong question (Kravis 1970; Haggard 1970). The argument 
whereby trade per se leads to growth is probably beyond dispute for relatively small 
areas or when it comes to countries poorly endowed with raw materials that can hardly 
be replaced by manufactured goods. But it has relatively little explanatory power in a 
context where the idea of comparative advantage appears to be less and less realistic
17. 
Put differently, trade is a necessary condition for growth; but it is not sufficient
18. And 
                                                 
16 The cost of these activities does not change with the extent of trade, but the rewards do.  
17 It may be useful to recall that the notion of comparative advantage implies differences in the 
production-possibility frontiers across countries, and that for such differences to occur, at least one of the 
following three conditions must be met. The frontier must reflect individuals’ specialization in different 
countries: at the beginning individuals specialize randomly, but the initial differences deepen as a result 
of a learning process. This is the Smithian explanation. Second, technologies are not transferable across 
countries. Therefore, trade cannot reduce differences in the marginal rates of transformation. This is the 
Ricardian view. Finally, there exist differences in factor endowments (especially raw materials), which 
are not subject to international trade. This is the Heckscher-Ohlin explanation.  
  None of these requirements seems to be an adequate description of the world as it stands today.  
18 See for instance Jansen and Kyvik Nordås (2004), who show that the effects of trade opening become 
substantial only if adequate institutions are in place, let alone the infrastructure required to reduce the cost 
of trading.   
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when it comes to international trade for relatively large countries, often times 
(international) trade is not even necessary.  
This puts the well-known export-promotion, import substitution dispute into 
perspective
19. If one follows the line of reasoning drafted earlier on, it is easy to 
conclude that both policies tend to distort the relative price structure that would have 
emerged form the unfettered interplay of economic agents. In addition, they are likely to 
favor and legitimize the introduction of a significant regulatory apparatus, which offers 
considerable discretionary power to the bureaucracy, establishes rents, strengthens 
interest groups, creates uncertainty and weakens property rights, the key to human 
action and entrepreneurship. Surely, these trade policies may well achieve some short-
run goals if they succeed in mobilizing resources that in earlier times could not be 
exploited because of other sources of distortions, e.g. currency controls and/or regulated 
capital markets. In particular, export-promotion policies can be relatively effective if 
they encourage producers to face competition on outside markets, acquire information 
about new products and technologies, attract foreign investment leading to better 
production capacity - and thus higher productivity - thanks to the privileges offered by 
the local government. Whereas import-substitution policies will generate growth if the 
alternative is some form of central planning. Still, although export-promotion policies 
exhibit a better record (Greenaway and Nam 1988), both strategies are bound to fail 
beyond the short run
20. As mentioned earlier, from the static viewpoint, they both alter 
relative prices and thus lead to a distorted structure of consumption and production. 
Whereas from a dynamic perspective they discourage risk-taking attitudes - investment 
                                                 
19 Export promotion refers to commercial policies aimed at stimulating exporters, possibly with tax 
incentives, cheap foreign currency, easy credit and other kinds of favorable legislation. It does not 
necessarily coincide with free trade, which is not discriminatory and thus rules out preferential treatment 
to exporting companies. In fact, the traditional version of export promotion is closer to mercantilism. The 
rational for import substitution also follows a mercantilist footpath, in that it advocates trade barriers in 
order to favor domestic demand for domestic products, and thus enhance domestic output.  
20 Liang (1992) has pointed out that these two policies are not incompatible, as shown by the S. Korean 
experience during the ‘miracle’ performed during the 1980s. During that period the government took care 
of selecting both the alleged winning industries worth to be protected and the most promising foreign 
market where efforts were to be concentrated. See also Chenery, Robinson and Syrquin (1986) for 
extensive documentation on the traditional trade-policy attitudes of mainstream economics (and endorsed 
by international agencies such as the World Bank).  
  Other authors have also proposed a distinction between outward orientation, characterized by selective 
protection; and inward orientation, characterized by generalized trade barriers. See for instance Westphal 
(1982).   
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and entrepreneurship  – to the benefit of rent-seeking. Corruption and  bad capital 
allocation are generally the most visible consequences.  
 
Extensive growth and government intervention   
The extensive approach to growth originated from Ricardo and maintained that 
aggregate output per capita can expand as long as additional production factors are 
employed. Before the industrial revolution this meant that higher living standards 
depended on the capacity to find new and possibly better land so as to increase 
agricultural production. Indeed, pessimism about growth was justified by reference to 
the fact that both land and capital presented diminishing returns, so that the incentives to 
expand would be stifled.  
This view generated the socialist and neoclassical approaches, which dominated 
post-WWII growth economics ( Arndt 1987). The former identified capital-intensive 
policies (including forced investment and industrialisation) as the only means to 
enhance better living standards
21. Whereas the neoclassical view ultimately emphasised 
the role of research, development, human capital.  As a result, in the socialist case 
government intervention turned out to be justified by the need to speed up 
industrialization and fixed investment, especially in those situations where private 
individuals were inclined to employ resources otherwise. Whereas in the neoclassical 
case the role of the state was related to the positive externalities generated by having 
                                                 
21 The socialist view differs from the classical one in that the latter does not consider coercive government 
intervention legitimate, not even for the sake of promoting higher living standards in the future (at the 
expense of the current generation).  
  When applied to undeveloped countries, the socialist view also encouraged aid policies. The key notion 
was that since most people in the developing world can hardly survive, savings are modest and the only 
way to finance capital accumulation is generous aid, part of which should be devoted to sustain 
consumption. As we know, this conclusion is flawed on two accounts. First, it neglects the fact that 
investments could be financed by foreign capital. If that does not happen, one should then wonder why 
foreign capitalists do not exploit allegedly great opportunities to earn substantial returns. The answer may 
be barriers to entry to foreign capital, or lack of opportunities, or lack of adequate protection to property 
rights. Modest and/or inefficient accumulation is thus a description (at best), rather than an explanation. 
Second, it neglects the fact that despite poverty, in most undeveloped countries individuals can mobilize 
substantial amounts of capital (De Soto 2000). Besides, the mercantile and industrial revolutions in 
Western Europe were not financed by aliens.   
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additional resources mobilised towards R&D and/or human capital, that is more inputs 
entering the production function of the national economy
22. 
  As mentioned earlier, the extensive approach to growth has played a key role in 
justifying government intervention. And for good cause. One can always figure out 
imperfections that omniscient bureaucrats can redress by replacing individual agents in 
the decision-making process. In addition the extensive view does not necessarily require 
having entrepreneurial bureaucrats, but only technicians with some expertise in input-
output analysis.  
The extensive approach to growth gradually lost its appeal as from  the late 
1970s
23, when its failure gradually became apparent. And although its influence remains 
very strong even today, perhaps in different and somewhat subtler forms
24, its 
theoretical foundations continue to be rather fragile. Unless in extreme cases, it is of 
course plausible to assume that the marginal productivity of capital is greater than zero 
and decreasing
25, so that assessing the long-run rate of accumulation per capita (and 
thus growth) boils down to a matter of empirical investigation concerning  three 
variables. One is demography. The other is the rate of time preference, which affects 
                                                 
22 Nobody ever cared to clarify why such externalities should take place at a national level (so that the 
best policies are national policies), rather than on a regional or on a world scale.  
23 One could actually argue that much of the trade-for-growth literature derives from an extensive 
viewpoint, whereby trade would allow a better exploitation of the existing capital stock as a consequence 
of a more efficient allocation of resources; and would also justify higher expenditure on equipment so as 
to satisfy greater demand.  
  If true, this reading of the trade-for-growth literature may explain why free trade tends to enjoy public 
support on a regional basis, but less so on a world scale. Since trade is perceived to benefit producers first 
and the economy overall only at a later stage, thanks to the expansion of the production capacity, the 
marginal benefits of free trade are significant only when producers face a free trade area that includes 
countries where they stand a chance to export and excludes countries with respect to which the domestic 
economy is expected to run substantial bilateral trade deficits. In other words, trade-for-growth eventually 
takes on a mercantilist shade, and tends to be identified with a job-creation vs. job-loss problem. Within 
this framework consumers’ choice and competitive pressure seem to play a minor role or remain out of 
the picture altogether.  
24 Caselli (2004), for instance, suggests that the main failure of this category of models is due to bad 
functional specification, and that better results could be obtained by spelling out the elasticities of 
substitution between the various production factors. 
25 It is decreasing because operators generally prefer high-yield projects to low-yield projects. This notion 
is of course of little interest from an economic viewpoint, both because it is almost a truism, and because 
the notion of return per se offers poor guidance to understand human decisions. For the real problem 
about investment strategies concerns the time structure of individual investment plans and includes 
comparisons across uncertainty profiles, expected returns, cost-revenue structure over time.    
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savings and thus investment. And the third one is the output gap, i.e. the distance which 
separates an economy from its supposedly constant production-possibility frontier.  
  Unfortunately, since the economic literature does not say much on these 
variables, extensive growth theories do serve the interest of the policy-maker, but hardly 
face up to methodological challenges. Demography is beyond the scope of economic 
investigation stricto sensu, apart from entering the picture in order to explain (1) why 
accumulation may take place in equilibrium, i.e. when capital per head is constant; or 
(2) the size of externalities to be socialized through government intervention. As regards 
the rate of time preference, economists tend to remove the whole issue by assuming it is 
constant, by referring once again to the representative individual, and quantifying it by 
observing the yield on low-risk assets. At best, this amounts to a  rather unrefined 
exercise in extrapolation, rather than an explanation. Indeed, other disciplines – say, 
psychology – are probably more qualified to provide useful insights in that direction. 
Similarly, output-gap studies do not explain why some countries lag behind and produce 
less than what one may expect. Instead, they describe the distance among countries in 
terms of GDP per capita and simulate how long it would take for a catch-up process to 
develop its effects. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that  the standard theory of 
extensive growth - better known as “exogenous growth” since the mid-1950s - is in fact 
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3. Development policies 
If one excludes the radical-liberal standpoint, which sees little or no purpose for 
collective policies, the debate on state intervention to promote growth and development 
remains inconclusive
26. Nobody questions that if a country displayed the textbook 
features of a perfectly functioning market economy, where transaction costs are zero 
and individuals made the best possible use of the existing technology in order to meet 
known and constant needs, income would be satisfactory and reflect the best possible 
use of the existing technology. Still, no matter how beautiful the Nirvana world 
described by neo-classical scholars and experts is, the very problem of growth and 
development revolves about how to obtain a suitable environment where individuals can 
strive to enhance their well-being, make use of the technology available, acquire new 
knowledge. Put differently, the real question concerns not only the definition of the best 
policies and organisations, but rather the creation of institutions which are effective in 
reducing transaction costs and preventing coalitions from distorting incentives and 
giving origin to - and maintaining - rents.  
  All this has been finally more or less accepted by the economic profession. In 
particular, it is now believed that every country must find its own way, while efforts to 
replicate textbook blueprints - such as the Washington Consensus - are most likely to 
fail. At the same time, although nobody denies that institutions are essential, it is also 
generally maintained that adequate policies aimed at institution building  would be 
highly desirable. So far the results have been rather disappointing, though. And the 
rationale for attributing a crucial role to government intervention to this purpose is not 
so obvious, either (see for instance Rodrik 2003 and Ranis 2004).  
  
Lesson from the Old Institutional School.  
As mentioned several times in previous sections, today the role of institutions is hardly 
questioned. The Old Institutional School
27 defines them as habits and routines that are 
                                                 
26 See for instance Ranis (2004) for a mainstream survey of post-war development approaches and 
policies.  
27 The birth of the Old Institutional School dates back to the end of the XIX century, with Carl Menger 
and Thorstein Veblen. But it is still well represented today, as witnessed by the work of - say - Geoffrey 
Hodgson and Douglass North (from the early Nineties).   
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shared and commonly accepted within a community. Favourable institutions are thus 
those cultural elements that encourage the development of the key-variables for 
economic growth: trade, entrepreneurship, individual responsibility, individual 
preferences, risk taking, competition. But if accepted, such a cultural framework bars 
those versions of the social contract or of social justice that justify violations of property 
rights, and thus coerced redistribution or constraints upon the freedom to exchange. 
When it comes to growth and development, however, the Old Institutional economists 
do emphasise that economics should be concerned with the analysis of different 
economic systems, the performance of which is explained by the logical connections 
among phenomena that can only be grasped by means of an interdisciplinary approach. 
But they have not succeeded in developing a full evolutionary theory of culture, 
informal rules, behavioural patterns (Hodgson 1998). As we know, inertia (path 
dependence) is the only relevant dynamics that the Old Institutional School has 
effectively proposed. And this is a long shot from a satisfactory explanation of 
institutional evolution. 
Still, the Old Institutionalists have made two important points that might open 
the way to stimulating insights for future work. First, it is now apparent that when an 
area displays unsatisfactory living standards - whatever that may mean, as discussed 
earlier on - three possibilities apply. It may be that the institutional framework is indeed 
conducive to growth, but a different set of formal rules prevails and thwarts the critical 
variables that foster growth. A second possibility is related to those cases where the 
dominant culture (embedded and shared routines) favours a moral system that is not 
conducive to growth. Societies where religion plays an important role and cohesion is 
strengthened around an established elite that renovates itself through co-opting 
procedures usually discourage self-responsibility and entrepreneurship. Similar remarks 
also apply to societies where ethnic or tribal tensions are present, so that individuals 
more or less deliberately accept to set aside liberty and opt for a fairly static rent-
seeking system that reduces tensions and the risk of conflict (but also of growth 
chances). A final picture refers to situations where path-dependence has broken down, 
but no new institutional pattern has come to the surface. That does not necessarily imply 
that agents operate in a vacuum. It does mean, however, that routines are fragile, people  
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interact on a reduced scale, and that since the rate of time preference rises, the time 
horizon shortens significantly and opportunities for growth are missed.  
When applied to today’s development economics the ‘old’ path-dependence 
view has further important implications. Although i nertia does not contain much 
explanatory power, its very notion explains why development policies  per se are 
questionable. For either the decision-maker decides to alter and ‘improve’ the 
institutional context, which is the dream of any social engineer but often ends up in 
disaster, since cultures cannot be changed by decree. Or one has to restrain from action 
and accept that agents do not necessarily share the same culture and do not develop the 
same routines: contrary to the mainstream assumption, there i s no such thing as the 
‘typical’ individual. And there is no ‘typical culture’, either. 
In addition, the concept of inertia sheds light on the nature of the problems that 
come to the surface when inertia itself breaks down, which is indeed what has been 
happening more and more frequently in the last couple of decades. If anything, this is 
the truly new trait of development economics. Quite reasonably, the Old Institutional 
story claims that institutions are a self-reinforcing mechanism that breaks down 
occasionally as a consequence of some external shock. For example, an invasion, a 
major change in the charismatic élites, dramatic changes in relative prices that in a few 
months or years could provoke the introduction of new routines and shared patterns of 
behaviour and interaction. If so, there is not much to explain; and the history of 
economic development becomes an evolutionary journey through institutional patterns 
(histories of civilization), the features of the potential shocks and ultimately ideologies, 
which can be entirely new or inherited from other cultures. The latter is of course the 
case in recent years, as access to the media on a worldwide scale has become relatively 
cheap and easy
28.   
To sum up, an economist inclined to policy-making cannot be very happy with 
the Old Institutional School, unless he has a chance to break away from path 
dependence or to intervene when settled cultural patterns become increasingly 
                                                 
28 Of course, the media operate both passively and actively. They allow individuals to compare their own 
patterns with those of other cultures and possibly change. But they also influence the agents, so as to 
induce them to accept new routines and almost bypass the traditional filters provided by experience, trial-
and-error processes, repeated interactions.  
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vulnerable, possibly to outside influence. The New Institutionalists have offered an 
alternative.   
 
 
The New Institutional School 
According to the New School economic performance takes place following given sets of 
rules
29, which in their terminology are known as institutions. The social scientist – and 
the economist in particular – is then supposed to study both the nature of the rules of the 
game and way they come to life. By and large, two possible functional dynamics are 
identified. One is the result of pressure exercised by interest groups aiming at creating 
or protecting rents to exploit
30. Trade or industrial policies fall into this category. On the 
other hand, institutions may also be the result of a competitive process, whereby rules 
end up by being created and selected so as to enhance interaction among individuals. 
Under some circumstances the former dynamics prevails and a society decays as 
individuals concentrate on rent-seeking activities, rather than on efficient production 
and growth. When the competitive process prevails, it originates an effective and 
possibly self-sustaining framework where economic activities prosper.  
  Of course, there have been attempts to find ways to make sure that the ‘good’ 
rules could be preserved and the ‘bad’ discarded. That has actually been the core of the 
research programme developed by the so-called Constitutional economists
31, who 
believe that a constitution based on the notion of rule of law and protected by suitably 
selected political philosophers would have kept rent-seeking groups at bay, allowed 
market forces to expand and pave the way to growth within an appropriate environment.  
                                                 
29 The New School is not that new, though. The debate on the dynamics of the rules of the game had 
already been made explicit some 150 years ago by Francesco Ferrara and Frédéric Bastiat. Today the 
New Institutional approach includes much of the public choice tradition, as well as the Chicago law and 
economics tradition and authors like Gary Becker, Douglass North, and Oliver Williamson. 
30 A more elaborate version is offered by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2004), who argue that 
selected groups get hold of political power only at the end of social conflict. By means of such power 
these groups shape the economic rules of the game. It is however left unexplained why interest groups 
must wait for social conflict to take place and why such a conflict is a necessary condition. See also Voigt 
(1999).  
31 The most important among them has probably been Friedrich A. von Hayek. See Voigt (1993), Hoppe 
(1994) and De Jasay (1996) for an exposure of the intrinsic contradictions of the constitutional view.   
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  Today the New Institutional view forms the backbone of the renovated 
neoclassical guidelines for development. On the one hand it preserves the optimizing 
approach that has characterised the last decades of mainstream economic theorising. On 
the other it is of course appealing from a normative viewpoint. By claiming that 
institutions are the result of human choice, rather than of a cultural heritage, it actually 
encourages a wide range of experiments in institutional engineering
32.  
 
Old and New: what does the loop show? 
As is often the case with conflicting views sharing a common focus and characterised 
by distinct axiomatic foundations, it is difficult to resist the temptation to offer a unified 
theory based on encompassing assumptions. Institutional economics has been no 
exception.  Although several synthetic versions can be identified, they all revolve 
around the proposition whereby individuals do operate within a general framework of 
habits and practices, but they may play an active role. They often try to change the 
existing routines in order to suit their needs and ambitions. Or they take into account 
new environmental conditions and adjust their behaviour to information or 
technological progress. In some cases such efforts lead to new routines, which then 
become part of the institutional setting.  
This is what Hodgson (1998) calls the ‘Action-Information Loop’. It is the key 
mechanism that brings the Old and the New approaches together. When it comes to 
development the loop may actually offer a description of why growth frequently fails to 
take off, or tapers off and some countries end up in some kind of a trap. This is actually 
the case when some coalitions succeed in introducing new routines that enhance rent-
seeking and remove or weaken key elements for growth. As these routines become part 
of the shared behavioural pattern, economic stagnation results. Western Europe in the 
last two decades could be an interesting case study along these lines.  
  On the other hand, the loop also reveals two decisive shortcomings of the 
institutional vision. First, the loop does not explain why some countries manage to 
                                                 
32 In this respect, one cannot help observing that when it comes to choosing among different institutional 
solutions, the neoclassical, apparently wertfrei efficiency criterion come out as the most attractive. And 
rightly so, since it offers logical consistency instead of loose opinions.  
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break away from the stagnation trap and some don’t; nor does it explain why some 
countries end up into a stagnation trap after enduring periods of successful economic 
performance. One can surely refer to the dynamics of the rent-seeking coalitions, but an 
established institutional theory of coalition dynamics is not available
33. Put differently, 
the loop offers a good description, but a less than adequate explanation.  
  In addition, it remains unclear what happens when the features and/or the 
legitimacy of the incumbent institutional framework (culture, habits, routines) become 
uncertain. As aired at the end of the section devoted to the Old Institutional School, this 
becomes increasingly frequent and may well be identified as the core of the transition 
problem. Indeed, during the last decades the very notion of a clearly identifiable culture 
has changed and possibly weakened. Cultural systems have become more open, as more 
and more people can now see and evaluate how others live and behave in the rest of the 
world, what kind of ethical system they share and what outcomes they generate. 
Individuals have been stimulated to question behavioural patterns that decades earlier 
would have been accepted as a matter of course. Education has emphasised hard 
science, technology and reduced the importance of moral disciplines. Last, but not least, 
family links have been softened and mobility has reduced the importance of developing 
long-lasting personal relations as a way to insure against undesirable events or carry out 
social interaction based on trust, not only from the economic viewpoint.  
As a result, increasingly large numbers of individuals – especially young people 
– do not take habits and routines for granted any more, let alone understand or be aware 
of their cultural background or heritage. And when inertia weakens, the moral 
constraints embedded in the institutional context are gradually replaced either by targets 
borrowed from other contexts (e.g. through the media) or by new rent-seeking 
behavioural patterns, whereby the new organisational rules of the rent-seeking 
coalitions supplant the previous institutional constraints. The recent and different 
experiences in Central and Eastern Europe, in several Asian countries (including Japan 
and China) suggest plenty of examples. Therefore, and contrary to the (old) institutional 
tenet, routines do not necessarily break down only  when a shock takes place. 
                                                 
33 See Quigley (1961 [1979]) and Olson (1982).   
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Unfortunately, this remains an open and important question, to which the loop does not 
seem to offer any reply.  
A similar critique can of course also be addressed when considering the rules of 
the game, which are supposed to change when new coalitions overthrow the incumbent 
pressure groups, or when the interests of the incumbent groups evolve and encourage 
their members to change the rules of the game. Instead, it is a fact that routines also 
break down when a significant part of the community does not accept them any more, 
either because of the moral codes they are based upon, or because of the results they 
yield. In the first case the break is triggered by ideological change; in the latter by sheer 
disappointment. Such a break opens a wide range of possibilities, depending upon its 
nature and the reaction of the outside environment. The success of development and/or 
transition follows the combination of such features. But once again it is imperfectly 
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4. Development economics and active policy-making 
It has been maintained that development takes place when the elements that discourage 
entrepreneurship and individual responsibility are removed, opportunities for exchange 
are expanded and property rights secured. Does that conflict with active policy-making? 
As a matter of fact, several success stories in Southeast Asia demonstrate that ‘miracles’ 
were also accompanied by substantial government intervention, which distorted the 
domestic price structure, carried out substantial redistribution; and at the same time 
secured property rights and enhanced trade through outward-oriented policies. 
  These ‘miracles’ are useful in that they draw attention towards two phenomena. 
The first is rather obvious: The positive effects that one could loosely associate with the 
establishment of the rule of law sometimes prevail upon the negative consequences of 
government interference. The second relates to the rules of the political game, whereby 
under given circumstances a government that stands a chance to introduce and/or 
strengthen the rule of law can stay in power only if it meets the demands of the 
dominant interest groups, which are not strong enough to form a cartel to stop potential 
competitors, but are strong enough to topple the incumbent political leaders.  
If so, one must accept that if the incumbent leaders want to make an impact in 
terms of development, they are obliged to provide rents to key actors, which in turn 
allow them to create an institutional environment suitable for growth. Thus, the ruling 
élites face the double task of carrying out the policies consistent with their legitimacy-
to-be, and buying out the incumbent rent-seekers. It is often an elusive game, played by 
a political class that is relatively fragmented or at least conditioned by small but 
relatively influential groups, and/or by coalitions (which can also include politicians and 
bureaucrats) that stand to lose from the introduction of the new rules of the game (which 
may or may not reflect new cultural patterns). The features and the outcome of this 
process are then crucial to assess the chances of development, which may result in 
short-term growth episodes, or sustained periods of growth. 
In the end, the success stories are those where government action succeeds in 
guaranteeing enough economic freedom, and the elites are legitimised by a shared goal 
which secures the ‘social’ contract between the political elites, the rent-seeking 
coalitions and the population at large. Indeed, in the case of the various Asian Tigers in  
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the 1990s - and possibly China today - such a goal was higher living standards for most 
layers of the population.  
Of course, this does not mean that failure to grow is due to lack of ambition for a 
better living, so that in the end poverty hits people who do not want to get richer and are 
unwilling to enforce a social contract based on growth or  – better  – to force the 
coalitions to sign an institutional contract designed to produce growth. But it does imply 
that when the residents’ main concern is the improvement of their living conditions, the 
ruling coalitions feel vulnerable, and refrain from excessive rent-seeking. Put 
differently, the credibility of a development process and the sustainability (length) of a 
growth episode depend on whether the opposing coalitions are effectively neutralised, 
on whether the new rules of the game create enough economic freedom to promote 
private investment
34 and on whether government policies reproduce the outcome 
otherwise generated by the market process without too many inefficiencies. As recent 
history shows, these conditions are difficult to meet in many parts of the developed and 




                                                 
34 Deregulation is of course the key element in this domain.   
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5. Concluding remarks 
Facts and theoretical schemes reassessed 
Explaining growth is the ultimate purpose of economic investigation. Indeed, 
understanding how and under which circumstances individuals and communities 
succeed in enhancing their well being is the very purpose of economic analysis.  It is not 
an accident that this discipline became a social science, and aspired to explain social 
phenomena by using a scientific method of enquiry with Adam Smith’s Wealth of 
Nations, when growth began to matter and in some areas of the world income per capita 
started to grow significantly.  
  As clearly put by Galor (2004), from the standpoint of growth the history of 
mankind can be divided into three broad periods. The first goes until the early 19
th 
century and features an extremely low rise in income per capita throughout the world. 
When adopted, technological improvement did allow increases in overall production. 
Greater output was however devoted to feeding larger populations, which would expand 
along Malthusian principles until the survival limit set by output was reached. As a 
result, income per capita stayed more or less constant.  
  Advanced countries experienced the First Phase of the Industrial Revolution as 
from the end of Napoleon’s wars. This period was characterised by greater 
technological  progress and substantial investment in non-human capital. As a result 
output accelerated, outpaced population growth and thus allowed an increase in income 
per capita. The Second Phase of the Industrial Revolution took place as from the end of 
the 19
th century and is not yet over. During this period fixed-capital accumulation 
stabilised in terms of GDP, but ceased to be the only engine for growth. The rate of 
technological progress gathered speed and investment in human capital took off, 
encouraged by manufacturers who needed more skills to operate the equipment, and by 
the evolution of life expectancy, which increased the present value of investment in 
technical education. As time went by, population growth rates began to decline, thereby 
allowing income per capita to rise even faster.  
  Any acceptable growth theory must produce a persuasive explanation of the 
phenomena that characterise the three periods briefly described above. They must 
explain the logical connections between the various events, why they  occurred at a  
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given time in history, why they took place in some countries, but not in others. In this 
paper the overall problem has been split into two broad sections. One has dealt with the 
logic of growth, i.e. with the mechanisms that explain growth in a context where 
acquiring greater purchasing power is indeed the main purpose of human action. 
Another one has dealt with the set of constraints or conditions that may prevent growth, 
even when the requirements for growth to occur are there or can be introduced with 
relative ease by means of sheer imitation.   
  It has been also been argued that today’s most fashionable growth theories are 
disappointing, to varying degrees. The neoclassical school is lacking both from a logical 
and factual standpoint. The exogenous view suggests that growth is a function of 
accumulation, but does not explain why agents invest different amounts in different 
countries and in different historical periods. In the same way, it does not explain why 
the frontrunners have frequently outpaced those behind and have experienced different 
growth rates over time. The endogenous view presents similar to the shortcomings, 
except for the fact that it replaces the emphasis on fixed capital by highlighting the role 
of supposedly increasing returns to investments in technology or human capital. Once 
again, the empirical evidence is weak: It does not explain the dynamics of growth over 
long historical periods, nor does it account for manifest miracles (Japan, China, 
Singapore after WWII) or miracles gone astray (Argentina during the 20
th century, 
China or Islam at the beginning of the second Millennium of the Christian Era).  
  The institutional view is indeed more satisfactory, but only marginally.  As a 
matter of fact, the old institutional school does describe why some cultures may 
enhance growth and others don’t. But it fails to explain what happens when cultural 
backgrounds become fragile and the very notion of shared values becomes questionable, 
or why certain cultures started to generate growth only during the last two centuries of 
the history of mankind.  
  As regards the logic of growth, these pages rely heavily on what could be 
defined as an augmented version of Galor’s theory of unified growth, where the cost of 
exchange (trade) provides the initial spark and entrepreneurship keeps it going
35. By and 
large, its building blocs are the following. It is a fact that the Malthusian period was 
                                                 
35 See Pomeranz (2000), where the role of trade as the engine of the Industrial revolution is duly 
emphasised.    
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characterised by modest trade opportunities and low life expectancy. As a consequence, 
restricted markets reduced the returns to entrepreneurial abilities. For the same reason 
technological progress was also limited and more inclined to satisfy scientific curiosity, 
than to meet economic needs
36. All resources were absorbed by the need to survive. 
Hence, income per capita stagnated
37. The First Phase of the Industrial Revolution took 
off because transportation became cheaper and safer, also thanks to Pax Britannica. 
Low trading costs enlarged the size of the potential markets and created new stimuli for 
entrepreneurial activities. In turn, these justified applied technological progress and 
greater fixed-capital accumulation. New machines called for new organisational formats 
and a more skilled labour force. At the same time, medical improvements extended the 
horizon for investment in human capital and contributed to enhancing the rewards to 
education. Therefore, it paid for parents to concentrate their scarce resources on a 
limited number of better educated children, rather than on a large quantity of illiterate 
offspring, some of whom would probably never reach adulthood (Galor and Weil 1999, 
2000). This explains the Second Phase of the Industrial Revolution.  
  Will there be a Third Phase? As argued above, it seems that the economic 
dynamics of the world economy has been deeply affected by the dynamics of exchange 
and thus trading costs. These have spurred investment of various kinds whenever the 
institutional framework allowed individuals to take decisions and be responsible for 
them. Put differently, local technical change created opportunities to be exploited by 
relatively free societies. As pointed out in earlier sections, extrapolation is tempting, but 
often tricky. Still, one can hardly help observing two relatively recent phenomena, often 
lumped together under the term ‘globalization’. One is enhanced trade in ideas and 
scientific knowledge. The other is enhanced mobility. If these trends were to shape 
economic history for some more years to come, one could perhaps conceive new 
categories of interaction between growth and development. In particular, and consistent 
                                                 
36 Economic growth does not depend on the rate of scientific innovation, but on the ability to transform 
technological advances into productive undertakings addressed to satisfy demand.  
37 This view assumes that parents intend to have a given amount of children, which until well into the 19
th 
century was above what the means of survival would allow. According to Malthus, this amount was 
determined by sexual impulse. According to the view presented here, parents’ decisions depend on the 
resources they can spend on their children and on the expected returns on their education. The latter 
variable is to be assessed with respect to expected growth, rather than to current income levels. The 
assessment on how much parents are willing to spend remains to be answered, though.  
  28 
with the line of argument developed in these pages, growth would no longer be the 
result of favourable institutional environments where chances are exploited, 
independent of where they have been created. Instead, one could have situations where 
economic freedom becomes a prerequisite to create chances. Put differently, 
technological breakthroughs and entrepreneurial challenges leading to higher 
productivity would become the joint product of successful (institutional) development. 
And institutional decline would no longer lead to stagnation, but to impoverishment.  
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